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Abstract
Competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) is a well-known
rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with different preferences.
It has many advantages, among them is the fact that a CEEI allocation
is both Pareto efficient and envy-free. However, when the resources are
indivisible, a CEEI allocation might not exist even when there are two
agents and a single item.
In contrast to this discouraging non-existence result, Babaioff, Nisan
and Talgam-Cohen (2017) recently suggested a new and more encouraging
approach to allocation of indivisible items: instead of insisting that the
incomes be equal, they suggest to look at the entire space of possible
incomes, and check whether there exists a competitive equilibrium for
almost all income-vectors (CEFAI) — all income-space except a subset of
measure zero. They show that a CEFAI exists when there are at most 3
items, or when there are 4 items and two agents. They also show that
when there are 5 items and two agents there might not exist a CEFAI.
They leave open the cases of 4 items with three or four agents.
This paper presents a new way to implement a CEFAI, as a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of a sequential game. This new implementation allows
us both to offer much simpler solutions to the known cases (at most 3
items, and 4 items with two agents), and to prove that a CEFAI exists even
in the much more difficult case of 4 items and three agents. Moreover, we
prove that a CEFAI might not exist with 4 items and four agents. When
the items to be divided are bads (chores), CEFAI exists for two agents
with at most 4 chores, but does not exist for two agents with 5 chores or
with three agents with 3 or more chores. Thus, this paper completes the
characterization of CEFAI existence for monotone preferences.
1 Introduction
Competitive equilibrium (henceforth CE) is a famous rule for allocating resources
among agents with different preferences. In the simple Fisher market model
∗A preliminary version appeared in the proceedings of AAMAS 2018. This version extends
the results to allocation of indivisible chores (bads). Additionally, it proves new fairness
criteria satisfied by competitive equilibria, particularly extensions of envy-freeness to agents
with very different entitlements.
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(Braˆnzei et al., 2014), there are several goods to allocate and several agents,
each of whom holds a certain amount of fiat money (“income”, also known
as “budget”). Based on the agents’ preferences, a price-vector is determined,
assigning a price to each good. Then, the items are partitioned among the
agents such that each agent believes his/her bundle is better than all bundles
that can be purchased with his/her income.
The CE rule has the two complementary virtues of efficiency and fairness.
First, the CE allocation is always weakly Pareto-efficient — there is no other
allocation which makes all agents happier. Second, if all incomes are equal, the
CE allocation (which is then called competitive equilibrium from equal incomes
or CEEI) is also envy-free — no agent believes that another agent has a better
bundle. If the incomes are different, the CE allocation satisfies a generalized
fairness property corresponding to agents with different entitlements, where the
incomes are interpreted as the entitlements.
When the goods to allocate are divisible, CE exists under very general con-
ditions. See Arrow and Debreu (1954); Bogomolnaia et al. (2017) for homoge-
neous goods and Weller (1985); Segal-Halevi and Sziklai (2018) for a heteroge-
neous good (“cake”). When the goods to allocate are indivisible, CE still has
strong efficiency and fairness properties (see Section 3), however, it might fail
to exist even in very simple cases. For example, when there is one item and
two agents with equal incomes, CE does not exist, since there is no price under
which the demand exactly equals the supply: if the price is less than or equal to
the agents’ income, the demand is 2; if it is greater, the demand is 0 (Note that
in this model money has no intrinsic value, so an agent always strictly prefers
to buy an affordable item than to remain with no items).
The example above could make us think that we cannot enjoy the benefits
of CE when there are indivisible goods. But a recent paper by Babaioff et al.
(2017) gives a new hope. They notice that, in the case of two agents, CE fails
to exist only when the incomes are exactly equal. If one income is even slightly
larger than the other, CE exists. So when there are two agents and one item, a
CE exists in almost all the income-space (except a subset of measure zero). We
say that in this case there exists a CEFAI — a Competitive-Equilibrium For
almost All Incomes. This raises the following natural question:
In what cases does a CEFAI exist?
Babaioff et al. (2017) proved that a CEFAI exists when there are at most 3
items, and when there are 4 items and 2 agents. Moreover, they proved that
this is not true when there are 5 or more items: they presented a market with
2 agents and 5 items, in which the subset of the income-space where a CE does
not exist has a strictly positive measure.1 They left two cases open: 4 items
and 3 agents, and 4 items and 4 agents.
1 These results relate to a very general setting, in which the agents can have arbitrary
monotonically-increasing preferences over bundles. Babaioff et al. (2017) also contains some
results for settings in which the agents’ preferences are restricted e.g. to lexicographic or
additive or “levelled”. These are beyond the scope of the present paper.
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1.1 Contributions
The first contribution of this paper is to resolve the two missing cases. It proves
that a CEFAI exists when there are 4 items and 3 agents; in contrast, when there
are 4 items and 4 agents, the subset in which a CE does not exist might have a
positive measure. The following table summarizes the results; stars denote new
results.
# Goods: 1, 2, 3 4 5+
2 agents:
Yes
Yes
No3 agents: Yes*
4+ agents: No*
The effort to solve the missing cases yielded a tool that may be interesting
in its own right and can be considered a second contribution. In the cases in
which a CEFAI exists (the cases marked by “Yes” or “Yes*” in the above ta-
ble), we present a sequential game that implements the CE in subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Thus, if the agents know each other’s preferences, the divider
can induce them to implement the CE even without knowing their preferences.
The assumption that agents know each other’s preferences is quite reasonable
in some settings. For example, when dividing cabinet ministries among polit-
ical parties, which is a common use-case of division with unequal entitlements
(Brams and Kaplan, 2004), parties often have a good idea about the preferences
of other parties.
The formal definitions are presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we prove that
a CE allocation has many fairness properties that are natural generalizations of
envy-freeness for agents with different entitlements.
The sequential game that we use to implement CEFAI is presented in Section
4. The settings of three, four and five items are analyzed in Sections 5, 6 and 7
respectively.
Section 8 extends the results to allocation of chores (items with negative
utilities). With two agents, we prove an equivalence between goods-allocation
and chores-allocation. It implies that both positive and negative results for
allocating goods between two agents are true for chores too. With three agents,
we prove that CEFAI might not exist even with three chores. So the table of
results for chores is (unfortunately) much simpler:
# Chores: ≤ 4 5+
2 agents: Yes* No*
3 agents: No*
Related work is surveyed in Section 9 and future work ideas are presented
in Section 10.
2 Preliminaries
There is a set N of agents, with n = |N |. The agents are denoted i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
or Alice, Bob, Carl, etc.
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Each agent has a pre-determined positive income (aka budget). The incomes
are denoted ti (for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), or a, b, c, etc.
There is a set M of items with m = |M|. Items are named z, y, x, etc.
A bundle is a set of items. For brevity, we represent a bundle as a string of
its items. E.g, xy represents the bundle {x, y}.
Each agent i has a total preference-relation ≻i on bundles. Only two as-
sumptions are made on the preference relations:
• Strict — no agent is indifferent between any two bundles.
• Monotonically increasing — an agent prefers a bundle over all its subsets.
It is not assumed that the preferences are quasi-linear with respect to money. In
the Fisher market model, money is used only to purchase items in the market,
and has no value outside the market.
A preference-relation ≻i is called additive if there exists a function ui :M→
R such that, for every two bundles X,Y ,
∑
x∈X u(x) >
∑
y∈Y u(y) iff X ≻i Y .
Our results do not assume additivity, but additive utility functions appear in
some examples.
A price-vector p is a vector of positive numbers, one number per item. The
price of a bundle X is denoted p(X) and it equals the sum of the prices of its
items: p(X) =
∑
x∈X px.
An allocation X is a partition of the m items among the n agents, such that
M = X1 ∪ · · · ∪Xn and the Xi are pairwise-disjoint. Note that in this model
all items should be allocated. This is in contrast to the approximate-CEEI
mechanism of Budish (2011), which may discard some items. Discarding items
might be very inefficient when the initial number of items is small.
A competitive equilibrium (CE) is a pair (p,X), where p is a price-vector
and X is an allocation and the following conditions hold.
Condition 1. The price of an agent’s bundle is at most the agent’s income:
∀i ∈ N : p(Xi) ≤ ti
Condition 2. Each agent’s bundle is better than all other bundles he can
afford. Equivalently, for every agent i and bundle Y 6= Xi, at least one of the
following holds:
The agent does not want Y : Y ≺i Xi, or:
The agent cannot afford Y : p(Y ) > p(Xi).
The income space is the set of all possible income-vectors: T := (R+)n.
Given a point t ∈ T, we say that CE exists in t if, for every combination of
the agents’ preferences, there exist a price-vector and an allocation that satisfy
the CE conditions given the income-vector t. We say that there exists a CE
for almost all incomes (CEFAI) if the subset of T in which no CE exists has a
measure of zero in T.
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In particular, if there is a finite set of equalities on the incomes such that
a CE exists whenever none of these equalities is satisfied (i.e, the incomes are
generic), then a CEFAI exists.
We emphasize that, when a CEFAI exists, the CE is allowed to depend on
the income-vector. I.e, for every income-vector t ∈ T (except maybe a subset of
measure zero), there may be a different allocation and a different price-vector
that satisfy the CE conditions.
3 Fairness properties of CE
It is known that a CE is always Pareto-efficient, and when incomes are equal it
is also envy-free (Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre, 2016). We now present a generalized
fairness guarantee that holds even when incomes are different.
This section focuses on a specific agent, Alice, with budget a, bundle A and
preference-relation ≻. We define:
• For every bundle X and integer d ≥ 1, Partition(X, d) is the set of all
partitions of X into d sub-bundles (some possibly empty).
• For every bundle-vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Yd) and integer l ∈ {1, . . . , d},
Union(Y, l) is the set of all unions of exactly l different bundles from
Y, Yj1 ∪ Yj2 ∪ · · · ∪ Yjl.
• For every bundle X and integers l, d with 1 ≤ l ≤ d, the l-out-of-d-
maximin-bundle of X is denoted
[
l
d
]
X and defined as: 2[
l
d
]
X := max
Y∈Partition(X,d)
min
Z∈Union(Y,l)
Z
where max,min are based on Alice’s preference-relation ≻.
In words,
[
l
d
]
X is the best bundle that Alice can guarantee to herself by dividing
X into d parts, letting an adversary pick d− l parts, and taking the remaining l
parts. This is a generalization of the maximin share of Alice, defined by Budish
(2011) as “the most preferred bundle she could guarantee herself as divider
in divide-and-choose against adversarial opponents”. In this notation, Alice’s
maximin share is denoted
[
1
n
]
M, where M is the set of all items.
We are now ready to state the first generalized fairness guarantee.
Proposition 3.1. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be a CE allocation. Let K be a subset of
the agents, K ⊆ N . For every two integers l, d with 1 ≤ l ≤ d:
a ≥
l
d
(∑
i∈K
ti
)
=⇒ A 
[
l
d
](⋃
i∈K
Xi
)
2 Babaioff et al. (2017) introduced the l-out-of-d-maximin-bundle. We introduced the no-
tation “l-above-d” to make Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 visually symmetric and easy to remember.
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Proof. Let P be the price of the union in the right-hand side, P := p
(⋃
i∈K Xi
)
.
By CE Condition 1, for every i, ti ≥ p(Xi). Therefore,
∑
i∈K ti ≥ P . By the
proposition assumption, a ≥ l
d
·P . Consider a partitionY ∈ Partition(
⋃
i∈K Xi, d).
Order the d parts in Y by increasing price, i.e, p(Y1) ≤ · · · ≤ p(Yd). Then,
p(Y1) + · · ·+ p(Yl) ≤
l
d
· P . Define Z := Y1 ∪ · · · ∪ Yl. Then, p(Z) ≤
l
d
· P ≤ a,
so Alice can afford Z. By the CE Condition 2, Alice’s bundle must be at least
as good as Z: A  Z. Since Z ∈ Union(Y, l), by definition Z 
[
l
d
]⋃
i∈K Xi.
By transitivity, A 
[
l
d
]⋃
i∈K Xi.
For eachK ⊆ N , Proposition 3.1 implies infinitely many different conditions
on A, but only finitely many are “relevant” (not implied by other conditions).
This fact is explained and exemplified in Appendix A.
To appreciate the generality of Proposition 3.1, we show that several known
facts are special cases of it.
3.1 Equal and almost-equal incomes
When all incomes are equal, a CE allocation is envy-free. Proof : take K = {i}
(i.e, a single agent) and l = d = 1. The left-hand side is true since a = ti. In
the right-hand side,
[
1
1
]
Xi = Xi so it becomes A  Xi, which means that Alice
does not envy agent i.
Similarly, when all incomes are equal, a CE allocation guarantees Alice her
maximin share. Proof : take K = N , l = 1 and d = n. The left-hand side is
true since a = 1
n
of the sum of all incomes; In the right-hand side, the union
equals the set M of all items, and
[
1
n
]
M is exactly Alice’s maximin share.
Similarly, when all incomes are equal, a CE allocation guarantees Alice her
pairwise-maximin-share (PMMS). The PMMS was recently defined by Caragiannis et al.
(2016). In our notation, the PMMS of Alice w.r.t. another agent i is simply[
1
2
]
(A ∪Xi). When the incomes are equal, a =
1
2 (a + ti) for every i ∈ N , so
Alice prefers A to her PMMS w.r.t. any other agent.
When the incomes are “almost” equal, i.e, the income of each agent is at
least 1/(n + 1) of the income sum, a CE allocation guarantees each agent the
“approximate maximin share” of Budish (2011), which is defined as
[
1
n+1
]
M.
The proof is similar to the previous ones.
3.2 l-out-of-d fairness
The following fact was proved directly by Babaioff et al. (2017). When the sum
of all incomes is 1, a CE allocation guarantees Alice her l-out-of-d-maximin
share, for every integers l, d such that l/d ≤ a. Proof : take K = N . Then the
right-hand side becomes
[
l
d
]
M, which is the l-out-of-d-maximin-share.
Note that the proposition in Babaioff et al. (2017) does not imply Proposi-
tion 3.1. For example, when all incomes are equal, Babaioff et al. (2017) only
implies that each agent gets his maximin share while Proposition 3.1 implies
envy-freeness, which is strictly stronger (Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre, 2016).
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3.3 Divisible goods
The following fact was proved directly by Reijnierse and Potters (1998), where it
was called α-envy-freeness. Suppose all goods are divisible, and the preferences
of Alice are represented by a linear value-function vA (so the value of each bundle
is a linear function of the quantities of the goods in the bundle). Then, in a CE
allocation, for every i ∈ N , vA(A) ≥
a
ti
vA(Xi). Proof: Take K = {i}. Since
the goods are divisible, for every integer d, Alice can partition Xi to d parts
whose value is exactly vA(Xi)/d. So for every integer l, vA(
[
l
d
]
Xi) ≥
l
d
vA(Xi).
So Proposition 3.1 implies that, for every l, d such that l
d
≤ a
ti
and for all
i ∈ N , vA(A) ≥
l
d
vA(Xi). We can take l, d such that
l
d
is arbitrarily close to a
ti
.
Therefore, vA(A) ≥
a
ti
vA(Xi).
While previous results only consider the cases in which |K| = 1 or |K| = n,
Proposition 3.1 is more general. For example, it implies that if Alice’s income
is at least 1/2 of the sum of incomes of Bob and Carl, then a CE allocation
gives her a bundle worth at least as much as the 1-out-of-2 maximin-share of
the union of Bob’s and Carl’s bundles.
3.4 Fairness with large income ratios
When a ≫ b, Proposition 3.1 guarantees only that A  B (by taking l =
d = 1). However, intuitively it seems that, if Alice’s entitlement is much larger
than Bob’s entitlement, she should get much more than just “at least B”. For
example, if a > 2b, Alice should get, in some sense, “at least twice B”. In this
subsection we show that CE indeed implies such a guarantee. But in order to
define it formally, we have to generalize the definitions from the beginning of
this section.
• For every set of bundlesX1, . . . , Xn and pairs of integers (l1, d1), . . . , (ln, dn),
with 0 ≤ li ≤ di for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define:([
l1
d1
]
X1
)
∪ · · · ∪
([
ln
dn
]
Xn
)
:=
max
Y1∈Partition(X1,d1),...,Yk∈Partition(Xn,dn)
(
min
Z1∈Union(Y1,l1),...,Zn∈Union(Yn,ln)
(
Z1 ∪ · · · ∪ Zn
))
where max,min are based on Alice’s preference-relation ≻.
In words, it is the best bundle that Alice can guarantee to herself by dividing
each Xi into di parts, letting an adversary pick di − li parts from each such
partition, and taking the remaining li parts from each partition.
With this new definition we can present an alternative fairness guarantee:
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Proposition 3.2. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be a CE allocation. For every n pairs of
integers (l1, d1), . . . , (ln, dn), with 0 ≤ li ≤ di :
a ≥
∑
i∈N
li
di
ti =⇒ A 
([
l1
d1
]
X1
)
∪ · · · ∪
([
ln
dn
]
Xn
)
.
For example, if a ≥ 2b, then a/2 ≥ b so a ≥ a/2 + b. Hence, Proposition 3.2
implies: A 
([
1
2
]
A
)
∪ B. I.e., Alice prefers her bundle to the best bundle she
can get by dividing her current bundle into two parts, letting an adversary take
away one part, and take Bob’s entire bundle instead.
If Alice’s value-function is additive, then the proposition has a simpler in-
terpretation: in any partition of A into two halves, Alice prefers the better half
over B. For example, if Alice’s values the items x, y, z as 4, 6, 7, then the allo-
cation (xy, z) violates the proposition, since even though Alice does not envy
Bob, both her items are worse than Bob’s item. Thus it cannot be a CE. On the
other hand, the allocation (xz, y) does not violate the proposition, even though
Alice’s utility from her bundle is less than twice her utility from Bob’s utility. 3
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The proof is similar to Proposition 3.1. By CE Con-
dition 1 and the proposition assumption:
a ≥
∑
i∈N
li
di
p(Xi).
In every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for every partition Yi ∈ Partition(Xi, di), the li
cheaper parts cost together at most li
di
p(Xi). Therefore, there exists a bundle
Zi ∈ Union(Yi, li,) whose price is at most
li
di
p(Xi). The union Z1 ∪ · · · ∪ Zn
costs at most a. By CE Condition 2, Alice’s bundle must be at least as good as
Z1 ∪ · · · ∪ Zn.
To conclude: competitive equilibrium can be seen as a rule for fair allocation.
It guarantees, to each agent, a multitude of fairness properties that generalize,
and strictly extend, the properties of both envy-freeness and maximin-share-
guarantee.
3 The interpretation “Alice prefers the best half of A over B” is not necessarily true
with non-additive valuations. For example, consider two agents with incomes a, b such that
2b < a < 3b. There are four items w, x, y, z and the agents’ preferences contain the following
relations (where a comma means that the relation between these bundles is irrelevant for the
example):
• Alice: xyz ≻ triplets ≻ wx,wy,wz ≻ w ≻ xy, xz, yz ≻ x ≻ y ≻ z;
• Bob: wx,wy,wz ≻ w ≻ xy, xz, yz ≻ x ≻ y ≻ z.
Consider the CE allocation (A,B) = (xyz,w) with prices (px, py, pz, pw) = (a/3, a/3, a/3, b).
In any partition of A into two subsets, Alice prefers Bob’s bundle to both subsets.
Moreover, any allocation in which Alice prefers the best half of A to B (while B 6= ∅) must
give Alice the item w plus one or two more items. However, any such allocation is Pareto-
dominated by the allocation (xyz,w). Thus, the condition “Alice prefers her best half over
Bob’s bundle” is incompatible with Pareto-efficiency, hence also incompatible with CE.
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4 Picking-Sequences and Pixeps
Motivated by the many fairness guarantees of CE, we now present algorithms
for finding a CE allocation for almost all incomes. The algorithms are based on
picking-sequences.
Definition 4.1. A picking-sequence is a sequence of m agent-names. It is
interpreted as a sequential game in which, at each step, the current agent in the
sequence may pick a single item.
For example, with m = 3 items, a possible picking-sequence is ABA, which
denotes a game in which Alice picks an item, then Bob picks an item, then Alice
receives the last remaining item.
We analyze these games assuming complete information, i.e, each agent
knows the preferences of all other agents.
We use the following backward induction analysis. The m-th picker just
picks the single remaining item. The m − 1-th picker picks one of the two
remaining items that results in a better bundle for him. For every possible
pair of remaining items we know what the m − 1-th picker is going to pick;
based on this knowledge, the m− 2-th picker picks one of the three remaining
items that results in a better final bundle for her. We proceed in the same way
down to step 1. We call every sequence of picks that results from this process a
subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). 4
For example, consider again the game ABA. In step 3 Alice takes the last
remaining item. In step 2 Bob chooses the single item he prefers. Suppose
w.l.o.g. that for Bob: x ≻ y ≻ z, then Bob will never take z. This means
that Alice’s bundle will be either xz or yz. So in step 1, Alice decides which
of these two bundles she prefers and chooses accordingly. For example, if for
Alice: yz ≻ xz, then in the 1st step Alice picks y. Then, Bob picks x and Alice
gets z, and the final allocation is: yz, x. Note that there can be more than one
SPE. In this case, Alice can also pick z in the 1st step; she will get y in the 3rd
step anyway.
Definition 4.2. (a) A picking-sequence-with-prices (pixep for short) is a picking-
sequence in which a price is attached to each position. The interpretation is that,
whenever an agent picks an item, the corresponding price is attached to that
item.
(b) Let S be a pixep and Q a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the sequential
game defined by S. The pair (S,Q) is called an execution of the pixep S. We
denote the allocation induced by this execution by X(S,Q), and the induced
price-vector by p(S,Q).
4 It is known that every SPE is also a Nash equilibrium, and moreover, a Nash equilibrium
is played in each sub-game (including unreachable ones). If rationality is common knowledge
(i.e., all players are rational, all players know that all players are rational, etc.), then the
outcome of a sequential game with perfect information is the one found by backward induction
(Aumann, 1995).
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For example, with three items, a possible pixep is:
A
4
B
2
A
1
(*)
which means that the first item picked by Alice is priced 4, the item picked by
Bob is priced 2, and the last item received by Alice is priced 1. A pixep can be
seen as a shorthand for an allocation rule; (*) is a shorthand for the rule: “Give
Alice her most preferred pair from the two pairs that contain Bob’s worst item;
price Alice’s two items as 1 and 4; give Bob the remaining item and price it as
2”.
4.1 Pixeps implementing a CE
The most important feature we require from a pixep is that it should implement
a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 4.3. Let S be a pixep and t an income-vector. S implements CE
given income-vector t if, whenever the income-vector of the agents is t, for every
combination of their preferences, there exists a SPE Q of the sequential game
defined by S, such that the allocation X(S,Q) with the price-vector p(S,Q) are
a CE.
When does a pixep implement CE? Consider the two conditions in the defi-
nition of CE.
Condition 1 requires that the price of each agent’s bundle is at most the
agent’s income. Moreover, as observed by Babaioff et al. (2017), for every agent
with a non-empty bundle, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the price of the agent’s
bundle exactly equals the agent’s income (otherwise we can increase the price
of an arbitrary good in that agent’s bundle until the bundle’s price equals the
income). For example, pixep (*) implements CE when the income of Alice is 5
and the income of Bob is 2. Therefore we impose the following requirement:
(R1) For each agent i in the pixep, the sum of all prices appearing below i
equals ti.
Condition 2 requires that, for each agent and each bundle not picked by
that agent, the agent either doesn’t want or cannot afford the bundle. To
make checking this condition easier, we impose the following decreasing prices
requirements:
(R2) The sequence of prices should be decreasing, and strictly-decreasing
whenever the picking-sequence switches between agents. For example, in the
pixep:
A
p1
B
p2
B
p3
A
p4
(**)
we require that p1 > p2 ≥ p3 > p4. This ensures that no agent can afford to
switch the item he picked in his turn with a better item picked by another agent
in a previous turn.
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(R3) The last price must be strictly larger than the income of any agent who
does not appear in the sequence. For example, in the pixep (**) we require that
p4 be larger than the income of Carl. This ensures that Carl, who is allocated
an empty bundle, cannot afford any non-empty bundle.
Henceforth we consider only pixeps satisfying (R1) (R2) and (R3).
4.2 Domination of bundles
Given an execution (S,Q), we define a domination relation on bundles based
on the positions of items in the sequence. Given two different bundles X 6= Y ,
we say that X is dominated by Y if there exists an injection f : X → Y such
that, for each item x ∈ X , f(x) appears (weakly) earlier than x in the sequence
S. For example, in a sequence of four items, the pair of items in positions #1
and #4:
• Is dominated by the pair of items #1 and #2, as well as by the triplet of
items #1 #3 #4;
• Dominates the pair of items #3 and #4, as well as the singleton containing
item #1;
• Is unrelated to the triplet of items #2 #3 and #4 (none of them dominates
the other).
Given an execution (S,Q) and an agent i, the dominating bundles / dominated
bundles / unrelated bundles of i are the bundles that dominate / are dominated
by / are unrelated to Xi, respectively. We will verify Condition 2 for these three
types of bundles separately.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose a pixep S satisfies (R1,R2,R3). Then in any execution
(S,Q), no agent can afford a dominating bundle.
Proof. If Xi is empty, then (R3) implies that any non-empty bundle costs more
than the income of agent i.
Otherwise, in any bundle dominating Xi, each item appears either at the
same location or earlier than a corresponding item inXi. Moreover, by definition
a dominating bundle is different than Xi so it has at least one item selected by
a different agent than i. Therefore, (R2) implies that it is more expensive than
Xi. (R1) implies that the agent’s income exactly equals p(Xi), so he cannot
afford a more expensive bundle.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose in a pixep S all the turns of agent i are in a single
contiguous sequence. Then in any execution (S,Q), agent i does not want any
dominated bundle.
Proof. Suppose the turns of i are a contiguous sequence of length k. Then, the
best strategy of i is to pick the best k-tuple from among the items remaining
on the table, and it is better than any dominated bundle.
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Example 4.1. In both pixeps (*) and (**), Lemma 4.2 holds for Bob. In (*),
he picks the best remaining item and obviously does not want the other item; in
(**), he picks the best remaining pair and does not want any other remaining
pair or singleton.
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 imply that, to verify that a pixep implements CE, we
only have to check the unrelated bundles of each agent, and the dominated
bundles of agents with non-contiguous turns. Moreover, (R3) implies that we
do not have to check any bundle for an agent who does not appear in the pixep.
5 Warm-up: three items
As a warm-up, we show in this section how to design pixeps implementing CE for
the case of three items and any number of agents. Babaioff et al. (2017) already
proved that in this case there exists a CEFAI, but the algorithm presented here
(Algorithm 1) is shorter.5
We can assume that all incomes are different, since this assumption removes
from the income-space a set of measure zero. We also assume w.l.o.g. that
a > b > c > all other incomes.
We now examine some picking-sequences to see if they can be made into a
pixep that implements CE. Consider first the sequence AAA, giving Alice all
three items. (R3) implies that the last price must be b + ǫ for some ǫ > 0.
(R2) implies that the second price must be at least b + ǫ, so we set it to b + ǫ.
(R1) implies that the sum of all prices must equal a, so we set the first price to
a−2b−2ǫ. (R2) implies that a−2b−2ǫ ≥ b+ ǫ, which implies that a ≥ 3b+3ǫ.
For brevity, from now on we will omit the ǫ from the notation. I.e, instead
of b + ǫ we will write b+, instead of a− 2b− 2ǫ we will write a− 2b−−, etc. So
the above discussion can be summarized as:
If a > 3b then A
a− 2b−−
A
b+
A
b+
The interpretation of this notation is: “If a > 3b, then there exists some ǫ > 0
such that the sequence AAA with prices a−2b−2ǫ, b+ ǫ, b+ ǫ implements CE”.
Clearly there are no unrelated bundles, so by Lemmas 4.1,4.2 this pixep indeed
implements CE when a > 3b.
As a second example, consider the sequence AAB. (R1) implies that the
last price is b, which is by assumption larger than c, so (R3) is satisfied too.
(R2) implies that the second price should be more than b so we set it to b+;
(R1) implies that the first price should be a − b−, and (R2) then implies that
a− b ≥ b++. Summarizing:
If a > 2b then A
a− b−
A
b+
B
b
Again there are no unrelated bundles, and by Lemma 4.2 no agent wants a
dominated bundle, so this pixep implements CE if a > 2b.
5 Note that they also prove existence of CE in some subsets of measure zero, like a = b+ c.
We ignored such subsets to keep the focus on CE for almost-all incomes
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Remark 5.1. When a > 3b, the two above pixeps, based on AAA and AAB,
both implement CE. This raises the question which CE is “better”. Intuitively,
if Alice’s income is much larger than Bob’s, it seems “fairer” to give all items to
Alice, while if the difference is not so high, it seems plausible to leave the last
item for Bob. However, these intuitions are not supported by the definition of
CE. From the point-of-view of CE, which is the one taken in the present paper,
both pixeps are equally good. Moreover, the allocations yielded by both pixeps
satisfy the fairness properties described in Section 3. We leave the question of
selecting a single CE to future work.
As a third example, consider the sequence ABC. (R1) implies that the prices
must be a, b, c, and by assumption a > b > c > all other incomes, so (R2,R3)
are satisfied. Lemma 4.2 holds for all three agents, so to verify CE we only need
to consider unrelated bundles. Only Alice has an unrelated bundle, and it is the
bundle of items #2 and #3. To ensure that Alice cannot afford that bundle, it
is sufficient to require that a < b+ c:
If a < b+ c then A
a
B
b
C
c
Finally, consider the sequence ABA. To satisfy the conditions we set the
prices to a− c−, b, c+. (R2) then implies that a− c− > b, so:
If a > b+ c then A
a− c−
B
b
A
c+
Here no agent has unrelated bundles. Lemma 4.2 holds for Bob, so to verify
that the above pixep implements CE, we only need to verify that Alice does not
want a dominated bundle. The only dominated bundle that Alice might want
is the pair of the two items picked last. Suppose w.l.o.g. that Bob’s ranking of
singletons is: x ≻ y ≻ z. Then Bob never picks z so Alice gets either xz or yz.
If for Alice xz ≻ yz then she certainly picks x first, so she prefers her bundle
over the dominated bundle yz. If for Alice yz ≻ xz then she has two options:
pick y first and get z last, or pick z first and get y last. Both options lead to the
same final allocation. In the first option she prefers her bundle to the dominated
bundle xz, while in the second option she might prefer the dominated bundle
xy. However, to prove that the pixep implements CE, it is sufficient to prove
that there exists a SPE in which the allocation satisfies the CE conditions, so
we can assume that Alice picks the first option.
Looking at the last two pixeps, ABC and ABA, reveals that the condi-
tions under which they implement CE cover all the income space except the
hyperplane a = b+ c, which has a measure of zero in T. Thus, we have proved:
Theorem 5.1. When there are three items, there exists a CEFAI and it can be
found by Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Implementing Competitive Equilibrium with m = 3 items. The algo-
rithm works in almost all the income space, i.e, for all income-vectors (a, b, c, . . . ) in
which a > b > c > . . . and a+ b 6= c.
If a > b+ c then A
a− c−
B
b
A
c+
If a < b+ c then A
a
B
b
C
c
Algorithm 2 Implementing Competitive Equilibrium with m = 4 items and n = 2
agents. Works for all income-vectors (a, b) with a > b, a 6= 2b.
1. If a > 2b then A
a− b−−
A
b+
B
b
A
0+
2. If a < 2b then play the sequential game below:
Alice may choose: A
a−−
B
b−
A
0++
B
0+
Else, Bob may choose: B
b
A
b−
A
a− b−
A
0++
Else: A
a/2
A
a/2
B
b/2
B
b/2
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6 Four items
6.1 Two agents
In this section there are m = 4 items. Initially we assume there are only two
agents — Alice and Bob — with incomes a > b. Babaioff et al. (2017) already
proved that in this case CE exists in almost all income space, but the algorithm
presented here is shorter.
Theorem 6.1. With two agents and four items, there exists a CEFAI and it
can be found by Algorithm 2.
Proof. The case a > 2b is handled by the sequence AABA:
If a > 2b then A
a− b−−
A
b+
B
b
A
0+
All three requirements on the price-sequence are clearly satisfied. No agent
has any unrelated bundles. It only remains to check that Alice does not want
any dominated bundle. This can be verified similarly to the case ABA in the
previous section: there exists a SPE in which Bob’s worst item is picked (by
Alice) at the last step. Alice receives the best of the three triplets that contain
this item, so it is better for her than any dominated triplet.
The case a < 2b is more complicated. It requires letting agents choose
between different pixeps. This leads to the following three-step sequential game.
Step #1: Alice may choose the following pixep based on ABAB:
A
a−−
B
b−
A
0++
B
0+
Step #2: If Alice does not choose ABAB, then Bob may choose the following
pixep based on BAAA:
B
b
A
b−
A
a− b−
A
0++
Step #3: If Bob does not choose BAAA, then we play the following pixep
based on AABB:
A
a/2
A
a/2
B
b/2
B
b/2
Intuitively, in Step 1 Alice chooses between her 2nd-best pair and her worst
triplet, and in Step 2 Bob chooses between his best singleton and worst pair.
The agents’ choices guarantee that, in the chosen pixep, they don’t want an
unrelated bundle they can afford.
Formally, we analyze the game using backward induction. We rename the
items such that Bob’s best item is w, and for Alice: wx ≻ wy ≻ wz.
In Step 3, Alice gets her best pair and Bob gets its complement. By Lemma
4.2 no agent wants a dominated bundle. Moreover, Alice cannot afford any of
her unrelated bundles (triplets), since a/2 + b > a. Bob can afford his two
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unrelated bundles (singletons). But, if he wants a singleton, he could choose
BAAA in the previous step and get his best singleton. So in step 3 it is safe to
assume that Bob does not want an unrelated bundle.
In Step 2, Bob has to choose between w (his best singleton), and the comple-
ment to Alice’s best pair. There are three cases: (a) If Alice’s best pair is xy or
xz or yz, then the complement contains w so Bob certainly prefers AABB. (b)
Otherwise, Alice’s best pair is wx and its complement is yz; if for Bob yz ≻ w,
then again he prefers AABB. (c) Only if Alice’s best pair is wx and for Bob
w ≻ yz, does Bob choose BAAA. In the latter case, Bob’s bundle is w. There
exists a SPE in which Alice chooses her three items in the order: x, y, z. Then,
Bob cannot afford xy or xz since they cost more than b. The only unrelated
bundle he can afford is yz. However, in case (c) Bob prefers w to yz, so Bob does
not want any unrelated bundle. Alice can afford only two unrelated bundles —
wy and wz. However, if she wants any of these pairs, she could choose in the
previous step ABAB and pick w first; this would guarantee her at least wy. So
there exists a SPE in which, in step 2, Alice does not want any unrelated bundle
that she can afford.
In Step 1, in cases (a-b) above, Alice never chooses ABAB, since she can
get her best pair by waiting for Step 3. In case (c), Alice chooses ABAB iff she
prefers the pair she is going to get over the triplet xyz. This pair must contain
w, so we assume that if ABAB is played, Alice picks w first. In her second
turn, Alice picks x (if it is available) or y (if x is not available). Now, Bob has
only one unrelated bundle w, which he cannot afford since a > b. Alice has one
unrelated bundle xyz, which by assumption she does not want.
It remains to check the dominated bundles in the case ABAB, since they
are not covered by Lemma 4.2. Alice receives a pair that she prefers over xyz,
so it is certainly better than any dominated pair. From Bob’s point of view, the
relevant sequence is BAB, which is analogous to the sequence ABA analyzed in
the previous section. Therefore, Bob too does not want any dominated pair.
6.2 Three agents
In this section there are four items and three agents — Alice Bob and Carl —
with incomes a > b > c. This case was left open in Babaioff et al. (2017). Our
new technique using pixeps allows us to solve this case.
Theorem 6.2. With three agents and four items, there exists a CEFAI and it
can be found by Algorithm 3.
Proof. While the algorithm for three agents is longer than the one for two agents,
it is based on similar principles.
First, it is easy to check that all price-sequences are decreasing, no agent
wants a dominated bundle, and Carl has no unrelated bundles. So it only
remains to check that Alice and Bob do not want any unrelated bundle that
they can afford.
16
Algorithm 3 Implementing Competitive Equilibrium with m = 4 items and n = 3
agents with a > b > c.
1. If a > 2b+ c then A
a− b− c−−
A
b+
B
b
A
c+
2. If 2b+ c > a > 2b then A
a− b−
A
b+
B
b
C
c
3. If 2b > a > b + c & a + c > 2b then A
b+
B
b
A
a− b−
C
c
4. If 2b > a > b+ c and 2b > a+ c (implies b > 2c, a > 3c) then:
Alice may choose: A
a− c−−
B
b− c−
A
c++
B
c+
Else, Bob may choose: B
b
A
a− 2p−−
A
p+
A
p+
where p := max (c, (a− b)/2)
Else: A
a/2
A
a/2
B
b/2
B
b/2
5. If b+ c > a > 2c and 2c > b then play:
Alice may choose: A
a
B
b−
C
c
B
0+
Else: B
b
A
a− c−
A
c+
C
c
6. If b+ c > a > 2c and b > 2c then play:
Bob may choose: A
a− c−−
B
b− c−
A
c++
B
c+
Else, Alice may choose: A
a
B
b/2
B
b/2
C
c
Else: B
b
A
a− c−
A
c+
C
c
7. If 2c > a then play the sequential game below:
Alice may choose: A
a
B
b−
C
c
B
0+
Else: B
b
A
c+
C
c
A
a− c−
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Ranges 1 and 2 and 3 are straightforward: no agent can afford any
unrelated bundle.
Range 4 is analyzed similarly to range 2 in Algorithm 2. The picking-
sequences are the same — only the prices are different. Recall that in the
Fisher market model, money is used only to purchase items in the market, and
has no value outside the market. Therefore, an agent who gets an item, does
not care whether the item was cheap or expensive. The agents care only about
the final bundle that they receive. Hence their strategic behavior is the same.
In Range 5, in both steps, Bob cannot afford any unrelated bundle. To
analyze Alice’s behavior, rename the items such that Bob’s best item is w and
Alice’s best pair without w is xy. Then Alice chooses ABCB iff she prefers w
to xy.
If she chooses ABCB, she gets w, does not want xy (or any other pair
without w), and cannot afford a triplet.
If she chooses BAAC, she gets xy, does not want w, and cannot afford any
unrelated pair.
To analyze Range 6, rename the items such that Bob’s best item is w,
Alice’s best pair without w is xy (hence for Alice xy > z), and for Bob xz > yz.
In the last step BAAC, Bob gets w and Alice gets xy. Therefore we will
get to the last step if both (1) Alice prefers xy to the singleton she can get
in ABBC, and (2) Bob prefers w to the pair he can get in ABAB. Alice can
afford only one unrelated bundle — the singleton w — but by (1) she prefers xy
even to her best singleton, hence also to w. Bob can afford only one unrelated
bundle — the cheaper of xz, yz. There exists a SPE where Alice picks x before
y; then, Bob can afford only yz. But by (2) he prefers w to the pair he can get
in ABAB, which implies that this pair must be one of xy, xz, yz, and not the
worst of them. So by choosing ABAB Bob could get at least yz. But he did
not choose so, therefore he prefers w.
In the middle step ABBC, Bob cannot afford even his cheapest unrelated
bundle (singleton). Alice has to choose between her best singleton and xy. If
her best singleton is x, y, z she surely prefers xy, so we play ABBC only if
Alice’s best singleton is w and she prefers it to xy. Hence, Alice does not want
any unrelated pair. Additionally she cannot afford a triplet.
In the first step ABAB, Alice cannot afford even her cheapest unrelated
bundle (triplet) since b+ c > a. Bob can afford only one unrelated bundle — a
singleton. Denote the pair that Bob is going to get by X . Bob chooses ABAB iff
he prefers X to the bundle he can get by not choosing. This bundle depends on
Alice’s preferences: (a) If Alice prefers xy to w, then she will choose BAAC, so
Bob chooses ABAB iff he prefers X to his best singleton w. (b) If Alice prefers
w to xy, then she will choose ABBC, so Bob chooses ABAB iff he prefers X
to the best pair that does not contain w. This means that X contains w, so it
is better than w. In both cases Bob does not want any unrelated singleton.
In Range 7, in both steps, Bob cannot afford any unrelated bundle. To
analyze Alice’s behavior, rename the items such that Bob’s best item is w, and
Carl’s worst item besides w is z.
In the last step, Bob picks w and Carl picks x or y, so Alice can get the best
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of xz, yz. She can afford only one unrelated singleton (w), but if she wants it
she can choose ABCB in the first step.
In the first step necessarily Alice prefers w to best(xz, yz), so w is her best
singleton and she picks it. Since b+ c > a, Alice can afford only two unrelated
pairs — the ones containing the last item. There exists a SPE in which this last
item is z. So Alice can afford only xz, yz. But if Alice wanted one of these, she
could have waited to the last step.
Finally, it is easy to check that the seven ranges handled by Algorithm 3 cover
all the income space except a finite number of hyperplanes (corresponding to
the equalities a = b, b = c, a = 2b+c, a = 2b, a = b+c, a+c = 2b, a = 2c, 2c = b).
Therefore, there exists a CEFAI.
6.3 Four agents
In this section there are four items and four agents. This case was left open in
Babaioff et al. (2017). Looking for pixeps turned out to be an efficient way to
organize the possibilities for finding a CE. After finding pixeps that implement
CE in several income ranges, we arrived at an income range in which no pixep
could be found. This failure yielded the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3. With four agents and four items, there may exist a subset of
the income-space with a positive volume where no CE exists.
Proof. The agents are Alice Bob Carl and Dana. Their incomes are denoted by
a, b, c, d. Consider the income subspace defined by:
2a > 2b > 2c > b+ d > a > c+ d > 2d > b > c > d
It has a positive volume since it is open and contains e.g. the point (16, 11, 9, 6).
There are four items denoted by: w, x, y, z. The agents’ preferences contain
the following relations:
• Alice: xy ≻ w ≻ xz ≻ yz ≻ x ≻ y ≻ z
• Bob: w ≻ z ≻ x ≻ y
• Carl: x ≻ y ≻ w ≻ z
Suppose by contradiction that a CE exists. We consider several (possibly over-
lapping) cases.
Case #1: (ABCD) Dana gets an item. By Prop. 3.1, all other agents
must get one item: Alice must get w (her best item), Bob must get z (his best
remaining item), Carl must get x (his best remaining item), and Dana gets y.
Prop. 3.1 is violated for Alice, since for her:
a > c+ d while A ≺ C ∪D = xy
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Case #2: (ABCC,ABCB,ACBB) Dana gets no item, and either Bob or
Carl (or both) get more than one item. Prop. 3.1 is violated for Dana, since for
her:
d > b/2 > c/2 while D ≺
[
1
2
]
B or D ≺
[
1
2
]
C
Case #3: (BAAC,BACA,BCAA) Dana gets no item, Bob and Carl get at
most one item each, and Alice does not get w. By Prop. 3.1, Alice must get a
bundle better than w. Such a bundle must contain both x and y. Hence Carl
gets either w or z. But now Prop. 3.1 is violated for Carl, since for him:
c >
1
2
a while C ≺
[
1
2
]
A
Case #4: (ABCA) Dana gets no item, Bob and Carl get at most one item
each, and Alice gets w plus one or more other items. So Bob gets at most one
item, and it is worse for him than w. Now Prop. 3.1 is not necessarily violated;
however, Bob must not be able to afford w, so the price of w must be more
than b; and Dana must not be able to afford any of Alice’s items, so the price
of Alice’s second item must be more than d. But this is a contradiction since
a < b+ d.
Hence, no allocation can satisfy the CE conditions.
7 Five items
In this section there are five items and two agents. Babaioff et al. (2017) already
showed that there may exist a subset of the income-space with positive measure
in which no CE exists. For completeness, we provide an alternative proof that is
based only on the fairness properties of CE proved in Prop. 3.1 and 3.2; thus, it
shows that even the CE fairness properties alone (without the other properties
of CE such as Pareto-efficiency) might be unattainable.
Theorem 7.1. With two agents and five items, there may exist a subset of the
income-space with a positive volume where no CE exists.
Proof. The agents are Alice and Bob and their incomes are a, b. Consider the
income subspace defined by: a > b > 3a/4.
There are five items: v, w, x, y, z. The agents’ preferences contain the follow-
ing relations (where a comma between two bundles implies that the preference
between them is irrelevant to the proof):
• Alice: quartets ≻ vwx, vwy, vwz ≻ vw ≻ xyz ≻
vxy, vxz, vyz, wxy, wxz, wyz ≻ pairs-except-vw ≻ singletons
• Bob: quartets ≻ triplets-except-xyz ≻ vx, vy, vz, wx,wy, wz ≻ xyz ≻
vw ≻ v ≻ w ≻ xy, xz, yz ≻ x, y, z
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It is easy to verify that these preferences are monotonically increasing. Suppose
by contradiction that a CE allocation exists. There are several cases depending
on the number of items given to Alice.
We show that, in each case, either Prop. 3.1 or Prop. 3.2 is violated for one
of the agents. We denote Alice’s bundle by A and Bob’s bundle by B.
Alice gets 1 item: Prop. 3.1 is violated for Alice, since for her:
a > b while A ≺ B
Alice gets 2 items: if A 6= vw then Prop. 3.1 is violated for Alice, since for
her a > b while A ≺ B. If A = vw, then B = xyz. Now, Prop. 3.2 is violated
for Bob, since for him:
b >
1
3
b+
1
2
a while B ≺
([
1
3
]
B
)
∪
([
1
2
]
A
)
(the rightmost bundle contains one item from B and one item from A, so it is
one of vx, vy, vz, wx,wy, wz; Bob prefers all these to xyz).
Alice gets 3 items: If A = xyz, then B = vw and Prop. 3.1 is violated for
Alice, since for her a > b while A ≺ B.
If for Alice xyz ≻ A, Prop. 3.1 is violated for Alice, since for her:
a >
1
2
(a+ b) while A ≺
[
1
2
](
A ∪B
)
(the rightmost bundle is at least xyz by the 2-partition (vw, xyz)).
If for Alice A ≻ xyz, then A is vwx or vwy or vwz, so B is yz or xz or xy.
But then Prop. 3.1 is violated for Bob, since for him:
b >
1
3
(a+ b) while B ≺
[
1
3
](
A ∪B
)
(the rightmost bundle is at least w by the 3-partition (xyz, v, w)).
Alice gets 4 items: Prop. 3.1 is violated for Bob, since for him:
b >
3
4
while B ≺
[
3
4
]
A
(the rightmost bundle contains a triplet, and Bob prefers all triplets to all sin-
gletons).
8 Allocation of Chores
So far we assumed that all allocated items are goods; this assumption was
manifested by the assumption that all preferences are monotonically increasing.
In this section we assume that all allocated items are bads, i.e., all preferences
are monotonically decreasing: an agent always prefers a bundle over all its
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supersets. In particular, the most desirable bundle is ∅. The items can be
thought of as chores that must be done, however, each agent prefers to do as
few of them as possible.
In the economic literature, CE for bads is defined just like CE for goods — by
Conditions 1 and 2 presented in Section 2 — the only difference being that the
budgets and the prices are negative (Bogomolnaia et al., 2017). CE condition
1 implies that each agent must do chores whose total price drops below his
budget. This means that agents with a smaller (= more negative) budget need
to do more chores, or less desirable chores. Thus, CE can be seen as a way to
divide chores fairly among agents with different liabilities, where an agent with
liability ti (a positive number) has a budget of −ti (a negative number).
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 do not use the sign of the budget or prices, so they
hold equally well with chores. In particular, CE with equal incomes is still
envy-free and satisfies the 1-out-of-n maximin-share guarantee. 6
One issue with this definition is that, when there are less chores than agents
(m < n), CE might not exist, since at least one agent gets no chore and thus CE
Condition 1 cannot be satisfied. This issue can be solved by adding “dummy
chores”, such that all agents are indifferent between them and the empty bundle.
With the addition of dummy chores, we can prove a positive result for two
agents, and a negative result for three agents.
8.1 Two agents
Intuitively, with two agents, allocating chores is equivalent to allocating ex-
emptions from chores. An exemption from chore is a good; therefore chores-
allocation is equivalent to goods-allocation.7 In this subsection we prove this
intuition formally.
We need some notation. Given a preference relation ≻i, we define its dual
preference relation, ≻∗i , as a relation that satisfies, for every two bundles X,Y :
X ≻∗i Y ⇐⇒ (M\X) ≻i (M\ Y )
Note that ≻i is monotonically-increasing iff ≻∗i is monotonically-decreasing,
and vice-versa. Therefore, ≻i represents preferences on goods iff ≻∗i represents
preferences on chores, and vice-versa. With this notation we can state the
equivalence theorem:
Theorem 8.1. Consider the following two allocation problems, defined on the
same set M with |M| ≥ 2:
6 One difference is that the relation between different conditions implied by Proposition
3.1 is reversed: with goods, a ≥ 2b/3 is stronger than a ≥ b/3 and A 
[
2
3
]
B is stronger than
A 
[
1
3
]
B; with chores (and negative incomes), −a ≥ −b/3 is stronger than −a ≥ −2b/3 and
A 
[
1
3
]
B is stronger than A 
[
2
3
]
B.
7 Bogomolnaia et al. (2017) explain why this equivalence does not work with n ≥ 3 agents:
for each chore, there are n − 1 identical exemptions to share. When n − 1 ≥ 2, CE might
allocate two or more exemptions to the same agent, which is not a valid allocation.
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• Goods-allocation problem: allocating the items in M between two agents
with monotonically-increasing preferences ≻A,≻B and positive budgets
(a, b);
• Chores-allocation problem: allocating the items in M between two agents
with monotonically-decreasing preferences ≻∗A,≻
∗
B and negative budgets
(−b,−a).
Then, there exists a CE in the goods-allocation problem, if-and-only-if there
exists a CE in the chores-allocation problem.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we assume w.l.o.g. that a ≥ b.
Goods CE =⇒ chores CE. Let (p, (A,B)) be a CE in the goods-
allocation problem. We transform this CE in several steps.
Step 1: ensuring that both bundles are non-empty. Alice’s bundle A obvi-
ously cannot be empty, since by Prop. 3.1, A A B. If Bob’s bundle B is empty
(so A =M), then we ask Alice to select a single item x ∈M such thatM\{x}
is best for her among all bundles with m−1 items. Then, we set A′ :=M\{x},
B′ := {x}, p′(x) = b, and p′(y) = r ·p(y) for all y 6= x, where r is a normalization
constant defined by r := a/p(A′). Note that r ≥ 1, since p(A′) ≤ p(A) ≤ a.
We claim that (p′, (A′, B′)) is still a CE. Proof: CE condition 1 holds, since
p′(A′) = rp(A′) = a and p′(B′) = b. CE condition 2 holds for Alice, since she
prefers A′ over all bundles except M, and she cannot afford M. CE condition
2 holds for Bob too, since in the original price-vector p, he could not afford any
item. In the new price-vector p′, the prices of all items except x are higher (they
are multiplied by r ≥ 1), so Bob certainly cannot afford them.
Step 2: ensuring that both agents exhaust their budget. Once both bundles
are non-empty, if the price of an agent’s bundle is less than the agent’s budget,
we arbitrarily increase prices of items in his/her bundle until the total bundle
price equals the bundle. The CE conditions are still satisfied and we still denote
it by (p′, (A′, B′)).
Step 3: creating a CE for the chore-allocation problem. We allocate B′ to
Alice, A′ to Bob, and set the price-vector to −p′. We claim that (−p′, (B′, A′))
is a CE in the chore-allocation problem. Proof : CE condition 1 obviously holds,
since −p′(B′) = −b and −p′(A′) = −a. To prove that CE condition 2 holds
for Alice, we have to prove that every bundle that Alice prefers over B′ by
her dual preference-relation, costs more than −b. Indeed, let X be a bundle
such that X ≻∗A B
′. By definition of the dual preference relation, (M\X) ≻A
(M \ B′). But M \ B′ = A′, so (M \ X) ≻A A′. Now, the bundle M \ X
must be unaffordable for Alice in the goods-CE, so a < p′(M\X). This implies
a < p′(M) − p′(X). But by Step 2 above, p′(M) = a + b. Hence we get
a < (a + b) − p′(X) which implies −p′(X) > −b. By an analogous argument,
CE condition 2 holds for Bob.
Chores CE =⇒ goods CE. Let (−q, (B,A)) be a CE in the chores
allocation problem. We normalize it as in Step 2 above, so that −q(B) = −b and
−q(A) = −a. We claim that (q, (A,B)) is a CE in the goods allocation problem.
The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of the opposite direction.
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Theorem 8.1 implies that the existence result of subsection 6.1 and the non-
existence result of section 7 are true for chores too. So with two agents, CEFAI
exists when there are at most four chores, but might not exist when there are
five or more chores.
8.2 Three agents
Unfortunately, the positive results for three agents do not hold for chores, as
shown in the following
Theorem 8.2. With three agents and three chores there may exist a subset of
the income-space with a positive volume where no CE exists.
Proof. The agents are Alice Bob and Carl and their incomes are −a,−b,−c
(where a, b, c are positive). Consider the income subspace defined by: .
0 > −a > −b > −c > −2a > −a− b
To see that it has a positive volume, note that it is open and contains e.g. the
income-vector (−4,−5,−6).
There are three chores: x, y, z. The agents’ preferences are identical, monotonically-
decreasing, and contain the following relations:
∅ ≻ x ≻ y ≻ xy ≻ z
Suppose by contradiction that a CE allocation exists.
Consider first the case in which each agent receives a single chore. By Prop.
3.1, Alice must get x, Bob must get y and Carl must get z. But then Prop. 3.1
is violated for Carl, since for him:
(−c) > (−a) + (−b) while C ≺ A ∪B
Otherwise, at least one agent receives no chore. Since the empty bundle is
preferred over all bundles, Prop. 3.1 implies that Alice must get no chore. To
satisfy CE condition 1, Alice must get a dummy chore and it must be priced
at most −a. The three real chores are allocated to Bob and Carl; at least one
of them must get two or three real chores. Suppose Carl gets two real chores.
Their total price is at most −c. So at least one of these chores costs at most
−c/2. Now, since −c > (−c/2)+(−a), Carl can afford the bundle that contains
this cheap chore and Alice’s dummy chore. Carl obviously prefers to do one less
real chore, so CE condition 2 is violated for Carl. A similar proof holds if Carl
gets three real chores or if Bob gets two or three chores.
9 Related Work
9.1 CE with indivisible items
Recently there has been a lot of interest in the computational complexity of
finding a CE in markets with indivisibilities.
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Deng et al. (2003) studied a market to which each agent comes with an initial
endowment (rather than an initial income) and all valuations are additive. They
proved that deciding whether CE exists is NP-hard even if there are 3 agents.
They presented an approximation algorithm which relaxes the CE conditions
in two ways: (1) The bundle allocated to each agent is valued at least (1 − ǫ)
of the optimum given the prices, and (2) the demand is at least (1 − ǫ) times
the supply. Both these relaxations are unrelated to our setting, in which the
preferences are ordinal and all items must be allocated.
Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre (2016) studied CE-from-equal-incomes (CEEI) as a
rule for fair allocation of items. They related it to four other fairness criteria
assuming all agents have additive valuation functions. They asked what is the
computational complexity of deciding whether CEEI exists. This question was
answered soon afterwards by Aziz (2015), who proved that the problem is weakly
NP-hard when there are two agents and m items, and strongly NP-hard when
there are n agents and 3n items. Braˆnzei et al. (2015) further proved that even
verifying whether a given allocation is CEEI is co-NP-hard.
Braˆnzei et al. (2015) studied CEEI also for single-minded agents. In this
case, verifying whether a given allocation is CEEI is polynomial but checking if
CEEI exists is co-NP-complete. Single-minded agents were further studied by
Braˆnzei et al. (2016). In contrast to our setting, they assume that each item
can come in multiple units, all of which must have the same price. They show
an example in which (1) a CE where all agents exhaust their income does not
exist, (2) a CE where some agents spend less than their income does exist.
They call this solution CAEI — Competitive Allocation from Equal Incomes.
Interestingly, in contrast to CEEI, it is possible to find a CAEI (if one exists)
in polynomial time.
Heinen et al. (2015) extended Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre (2016) from additive
to k-additive utility functions, in which each agent reports a value for bundles
containing at most k items, and the values of larger bundles are determined by
adding and subtracting the values of the basic bundles.
Budish (2011) studied the most general setting in which agents can have
arbitrary preference relations over bundles. He invented a beautiful and prac-
tical approximate CEEI mechanism, which relaxes the CEEI conditions in two
ways: (1) The agents’ incomes are not exactly equal, and (2) a small number
of items may remain unallocated. He proved that an approximate-CEEI always
exists (although Othman et al. (2016) recently proved that the computation of
approximate-CEEI is PPAD-complete). The first relaxation (1) is closely re-
lated to our setting where incomes must not be exactly equal. However, the
second relaxation (2) make his solution less useful when the initial number of
items is small.
Barman and Krishnamurthy (2019) study Fisher markets in which all agents
have additive utilities. They show that a fractional CE (where some goods
are divided) can always be rounded to an integral CE (where goods remain
indivisible), by changing the agents’ budgets. The change in each budget can
be as high as the largest price of a good in the fractional CE. Thus, their paper
do not answer the question whether a CE exists for almost all budget-vectors.
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9.2 Picking-sequences
Picking-sequences are common practical mechanisms for allocating indivisible
items. They are favored due to their simplicity, privacy and low communication
complexity.
Brams and Kaplan (2004) and Brams (2007) study picking-sequences for
allocating cabinet ministries among parties. There is a coalition of parties; each
party has a different number of seats in the parliament; larger parties should be
allocated more ministries, or more prestigious ministries. This is an interesting
use-case of fair division with different entitlements. A possible solution to this
problem is to determine a picking-sequence, based on the different entitlements,
and let each party pick a ministry in turn. Such a solution is used in Northern
Ireland, Denmark and the European parliament (O’Leary et al., 2005).
Brams and Kaplan assume that each agent has a strict ordering on the items,
and has responsive preferences on bundles of items. Responsive preferences are
more general than additive preferences, but less general than the monotone
preferences studied in this paper (Babaioff et al., 2017). With strict responsive
preferences, at each point in the picking-sequence, there is a single remaining
item which is the “best item” for the picking agent. An agent can be “truthful”
and pick the best item, or be “strategic” and pick another item based on his
knowledge of the other agents’ valuations. They prove several results that may
be relevant for future development of pixeps: (1) With two agents, both truthful
and strategic choices lead to Pareto efficient allocations. Moreover, the game is
monotonic in the following sense: an agent is always better-off if one or more of
his positions in the sequence are improved (e.g, Alice is better-off in the sequence
ABBA than in BABA). (2) Both properties are still true with three or more
truthful agents. But with three or more strategic agents, a picking-sequence
might lead to inefficient allocations (i.e, the SPE might not be Pareto-efficient).
With three or more strategic agents, the game might be non-monotonic, i.e, an
agent might do worse by picking earlier in the sequence. (3) For two agents, a
simple modification of the picking-sequence game leads to a truthful mechanism,
in which picking the best remaining item truthfully is a dominant strategy. This
makes the computation of SPE much easier.
Recently, Aziz et al. (2017) further discuss the strategic properties of picking-
sequences when agents have additive valuations. They do not discuss whether
the Nash equilibrium is also a competitive-equilibrium, or whether it satisfies
any notion of fairness.
Another line of work related to picking-sequences is how to select a picking-
sequence that maximizes some global objective. Bouveret and Lang (2011)
study this question under the assumption that all valuation functions are ad-
ditive, and moreover, there is a single common scoring-function that relates
the rank of an item in an agent’s ranking to its monetary value. The alloca-
tor does not know the rankings of the agents, but he knows that all rankings
are random draws from a given probability distribution. The allocator’s goal
is to maximize the expected value of some social welfare function. They show
picking-sequences that maximize the expected utilitarian welfare (sum of utili-
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ties) or the expected egalitarian welfare (minimum utility) in various settings.
Kalinowski et al. (2013) show that, when there are two agents with a Borda
scoring function, and each ranking is equally probable, the ”round robin” se-
quence (ABABAB...) attains the maximal expected sum-of-utilities.
Picking-sequences fundamentally differ from serial dictatorship (whether de-
terministic or random): serial dictatorship is dominant-strategy truthful since
each agent has only one chance to choose; it is usually used in matching markets
where each agent is entitled to one item. In contrast, picking-sequences let each
agent pick more than one time, and usually they have no dominant strategies.
Algorithms 2 and 3 let each agent in turn select a possible pixep, until fi-
nally a default pixep is played. This is similar to the alternating-offers protocol
for negotiation between two players, where each player suggests a possible out-
come until an agreement is reached (Anbarci, 1993, 2006; Erlich et al., 2018).
This connection may possibly be used to develop more succinct algorithms for
selecting a pixep; we leave this development to future work.
9.3 Unequal entitlements
Fair division with unequal entitlements has been studied with respect to a di-
visible resource (“cake”); see Cseh and Fleiner (2018); Segal-Halevi (2018) for
recent surveys. Recently, Farhadi et al. (2017) studied fair allocation of indivis-
ible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. This problem is closely related
to competitive equilibrium with unequal incomes. Their results are mostly neg-
ative: even when all agents have additive valuations, a “fair” allocation (accord-
ing to their definition of fairness) might not exist and cannot be approximated
to within a factor of n. CEFAI provides an alternative that, in some cases,
yields more positive results.
10 Future Work
10.1 Restricted preference domains
This paper assumes that agents can have arbitrary monotonic preferences. An
interesting topic for future work is to study more specific preference domains.
In particular, in what cases does CEFAI exist when all agents have additive
preferences?
For 4 agents and 4 items, CEFAI does not exist even with additive prefer-
ences. This follows from subsection 6.3, in which the preferences are additive.
For example, Alice’s valuations for w, x, y, z can be 11, 7, 5, 3 and the other
agents’ valuations can be arbitrary numbers consistent with their orderings.
However, in section 7, the preferences are not additive:
• For Alice, we had xyz ≻ vxy, vxz, vyz, wxy, wxz, wyz; with additive pref-
erences, this implies that each of x, y, z is preferred to each of v, w, which
implies xy ≻ vw, which implies xyz ≻ vw; but we had vw ≻ xyz — a
contradiction.
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• For Bob, we had vx, vy, vz, wx,wy, wz ≻ vw; with additive preferences,
this implies that each of x, y, z is preferred to each of v, w. But we had
vxy, vxz, vyz, wxy, wxz, wyz ≻ xyz, which implies the opposite.
Therefore, for 2 or 3 additive agents, the existence of CEFAI is still an open
question. Babaioff et al. (2017) provide a partial solution for the case of 2 agents
with additive preferences and any number of items, but a general solution is still
not known.
As for chores: the duality theorem in subsection 8.1 implies that, if CEFAI
exists for two agents with additive preferences, then the same is true for both
goods and chores. With three or more agents, the example in subsection 8.2
is compatible with additive preferences (e.g. the valuations for x, y, z can be
−1,−2,−4). Therefore, when dividing chores among three or more agents,
CEFAI does not exist even with additive valuations.
10.2 Finding pixeps automatically
The pixeps in this paper were found manually. It may be useful to build a
program for automatically finding pixeps in domains in which the existence of
CE is not settled yet (for example, two agents with additive utilities). When
the number of items is sufficiently small, it may be possible to check all picking-
sequences, for each one of them calculate prices that satisfy the requirements
(R1,R2,R3) for some subset of the income-space, and finally check whether the
entire income-space is covered.
Unfortunately, while such a program may help to prove the existence of CE,
it cannot be used to prove non-existence. As shown in the following example,
some competitive equilibria cannot be implemented in SPE by a pixep satisfying
the decreasing-prices condition.
Example 10.1. There are 4 items and 2 agents with incomes (a, b) = (8, 7)
and preferences:
• Alice: wx ≻ wy ≻ wz ≻ xy ≻ xz ≻ yz;
• Bob: xy ≻ xz ≻ yz ≻ wx ≻ wy ≻ wz.
Consider the allocation (A,B) = (wz, xy). It is a CE, for example, with price-
vector (pw, px, py, pz) = (6, 4, 3, 2). Note that px > pz and py > pz. This is
necessary for a CE, since otherwise Alice could afford wx or wy, which she
prefers to wz. Note also that pw > px and pw > py. This is also necessary for
a CE in which agents exhaust their incomes, since pw = a − pz > b − py = px
and similarly pw > py.
If such a CE could be implemented by a pixep with decreasing-prices, then
the sequence should be ABBA. But the allocation (wz, xy) is not a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of this sequence: in SPE, Alice picks x first, since then Bob
picks yz and Alice gets wx, which she prefers to wz.
If we drop the decreasing-prices requirement, then the allocation (wz, xy)
can be implemented in SPE by a pixep with a different sequence: BBAA. It
this possible for any CE allocation?
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A Relations Between Different CE Fairness Prop-
erties
Proposition 3.1 implies many different fairness conditions that are satisfied by
a CE allocation. The present appendix studies the relations between different
such conditions: which of them are independent and which of them are implied
by others.
A.1 Different bundles at right-hand side
First, we check what happens when we take different bundles as the right-hand
side of the inequality in Prop. 3.1. Suppose there are two agents with budgets
a, b. Then, for any two integers l, d:
a >
l
d
b ⇐⇒ a >
l
l + d
(a+ b)
Each of the above inequalities induces a different fairness condition. Does any
of these conditions imply the other? The following two examples show that the
answer is no. In both examples the agents are additive, they have identical
valuations, and their budgets satisfy the following equivalent conditions:
a > b/2 ⇐⇒ a > (a+ b)/3
Below, the leftmost condition is stronger:
A = {5} B = {6, 7}
A 6
[
1
2
]
B = {6} A 
[
1
3
]
(A ∪B) = {5}
Below, the rightmost condition is stronger:
A = {1, 1, 1} B = {3, 3, 3}
A 
[
1
2
]
B = {3} A 6
[
1
3
]
(A ∪B) = {1, 3}
A similar example shows that Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are independent —
none of them implies the other:
a > 2b ⇐⇒ a > 2(a+ b)/3
Below, the condition implied by Prop. 3.2 is stronger:
A = {2, 3} B = {4}
A 6
([
1
2
]
A
)
∪B = {2, 4} A 
[
2
3
]
(A ∪B) = {2, 3}
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Below, the condition implied by Prop. 3.1 is stronger:
A = {3, 3, 3} B = {2, 2, 2}
A 
([
1
2
]
A
)
∪B = {3, 2, 2, 2} A 6
[
2
3
]
(A ∪B) = {2, 2, 3, 3}
A.2 Different income-ratios at right-hand side
Next, we check what happens when we change the nominator and denominator
at the right-hand side of the inequality in Prop. 3.1.
The proofs use a technical lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let l, d, l′, d′ be integers such that 1 ≤ l ≤ d and 1 ≤ l′ ≤ d′.
Let X be a bundle. Suppose that, for every partition Y′ ∈ Partition(X, d′),
there exists a partition Y ∈ Partition(X, d). such that minUnion(Y, l) 
minUnion(Y′, l′). Then Alice weakly prefers her l-out-of-d maximin share of
X over her l′-out-of-d′ maximin share of X:[
l
d
]
X 
[
l′
d′
]
X
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of the maximin share as maxi-
mizing over all partitions of X .
It is trivial to show that, in the expression
[
l
d
]
X , if we increase l and/or
decrease d, we get a weakly better bundle:
Lemma A.2. Let l, d, l′, d′ be integers such that 1 ≤ l ≤ d and 1 ≤ l′ ≤ d′. Let
X be any bundle. If l ≥ l′ and d ≤ d′, then[
l
d
]
X 
[
l′
d′
]
X
Proof. For every partition Y′ ∈ Partition(X, d′), create an arbitrary partition
in Y ∈ Partition(X, d) by unifying some d′ − d parts in Y′. Every bundle
Z ∈ Union(Y, l) contains a bundle Z ′ ∈ Union(Y, l′). By monotonicity, Z 
Z ′. Therefore, minUnion(Y, l)  minUnion(Y′, l′) and the claim follows from
Lemma A.1.
It is less trivial to analyze the case when l and d change simultaneously in
the same direction:
Lemma A.3. For every bundle X and integers 1 ≤ h < l ≤ d:
(a) [
l
d
]
X 
[
l − h
d− h
]
X
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(b) If |X | ≤ d− h then the opposite is also true:[
l − h
d− h
]
X 
[
l
d
]
X
i.e., the two bundles are equivalent.
Proof. (a) For every partition Y′ ∈ Partition(X, d − h), consider the par-
tition Y ∈ Partition(X, d) in which the first d − h parts are identical to
the corresponding parts in Y′, and the other h parts are ∅. Every bundle
Z ∈ Union(Y, l) is a union of at least l−h parts from Y′ and at most h empty
sets; let Z ′ be the union of the l − h parts from Y′. So Z ′ ∈ Union(Y′, l − h)
and Z  Z ′. Therefore, minUnion(Y, l)  minUnion(Y′, l−h) and the claim
follows from Lemma A.1.
(b) In every partition Y′ ∈ Partition(X, d), at most d − h parts are non-
empty. Consider a partition Y ∈ Partition(X, d− h) which contains all non-
empty parts. Then, each bundle Z ∈ Union(Y, l − h) is also contained in
Union(Y′, l). Therefore, minUnion(Y, l − h)  minUnion(Y′, l) and the
claim follows from Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.4. For every bundle X and integers 1 ≤ l ≤ d and h ≥ 1:[
l
d
]
X 
[
h · l
h · d
]
X
Proof. For every partition Y′ ∈ Partition(X,h · d), consider the partition
Y ∈ Partition(X, d) in which each part is the union of h distinct parts from
Y′. Then, each bundle Z ∈ Union(Y, l) is also contained in Union(Y′, h · l).
Therefore, minUnion(Y, l)  minUnion(Y′, h · l) and the claim follows from
Lemma A.1.
So in Proposition 3.1, for each value of d, only the largest integer l for which
l/d ≤ a is interesting. Moreover, only values of d that are not larger than the
number of items in the union
⋃
i∈K Xi are interesting. Finally, only reduced
fractions are interesting. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example A.1. There are two agents: Alice and Bob, with bundles A,B and
budgets a, b, with a = 0.74b. Bob’s bundle contains 7 items. Then, Prop. 3.1
implies the following conditions on A and B:
• For d = 2: A 
[
1
2
]
B. By Lemma A.3(a), this follows from A 
[
2
3
]
B
(below).
• For d = 3: A 
[
1
3
]
B and A 
[
2
3
]
B. By Lemma A.2, the former follows
from the latter .
• For d = 4: A 
[
2
4
]
B. By Lemma A.4, this follows from A 
[
1
2
]
B.
• For d = 5: A 
[
3
5
]
B. By Lemma A.3(a), this follows from A 
[
5
7
]
B
(below).
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• For d = 6: A 
[
4
6
]
B. By Lemma A.4, this follows from A 
[
2
3
]
B.
• For d = 7: A 
[
5
7
]
B.
• For d = 8: A 
[
5
8
]
B. But, since Bob only has 7 items, this follows from
A 
[
4
7
]
B by Lemma A.3(b).
Therefore, only the following two conditions regarding A,B are “interesting”
(not implied by others):
A 
[
2
3
]
B A 
[
5
7
]
B
These two conditions are independent. For example, suppose Alice’s preferences
are additive. Then, if she values the items in B as {1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0} then
[
2
3
]
B =
2 and
[
5
7
]
B = 1 so the leftmost condition is stronger, while if she values the items
in B as {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} then
[
2
3
]
B = 4 and
[
5
7
]
B = 5 so the rightmost condition
is stronger.
A.3 Fairness conditions do not imply CE
Since Prop. 3.1 and 3.2 imply so many different fairness conditions, one could
think that the combination of all these fairness conditions, together with Pareto
efficiency, is equivalent to CE. However, the following example shows that this
is not true.
Example A.2. There are two agents with budgets:
a ∈ (1/2, 3/5) b ∈ (2/5, 1/2) a+ b = 1
The agents have identical additive valuations. There are four items whose values
are 2,2,3,5. They are allocated as follows:
A = {3, 5} B = {2, 2}
Since the valuations are identical, the allocation is Pareto-efficient. Since there
are 4 items, only fairness conditions with denominators 2, 3 and 4 may be
interesting (not implied by stronger conditions).
For Alice, the interesting conditions are:
a >
1
1
b a >
1
2
(a+ b) a >
1
2
a+
1
2
b
(other conditions are weaker, as can be checked using the lemmas of the previous
subsection). The relevant fairness conditions are satisfied, since:
A  B A 
[
1
2
]
(A ∪B) = {2, 3} A 
([
1
2
]
A
)
∪
([
1
2
]
B
)
= {2, 3}
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For Bob, the interesting conditions are:
b >
1
2
a b >
1
3
(a+ b)
The relevant fairness conditions are satisfied, since:
B 
[
1
2
]
A = {3} B 
[
1
3
]
(A ∪B) = {3}
However, there is no price-vector under which this is CE. Proof. In CE, the
price of the 5 must be more than b > 2/5. Therefore, the price of the 3 must
be less than a− b < 1/5. On the other hand, the price of at least one of the 2’s
must be at least b/2 > 1/5. So Bob can sell this item and buy the 3. 9
References
Anbarci, N. (1993). Noncooperative foundations of the area monotonic solution.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(1):245–258.
Anbarci, N. (2006). Finite alternating-move arbitration schemes and the equal
area solution. Theory and decision, 61(1):21–50.
Arrow, K. J. and Debreu, G. (1954). Existence of an Equilibrium for a Com-
petitive Economy. Econometrica, 22(3):265–290.
Aumann, R. J. (1995). Backward induction and common knowledge of ratio-
nality. Games and Economic Behavior, 8(1):6–19.
Aziz, H. (2015). Competitive equilibrium with equal incomes for allocation of
indivisible objects. Operations Research Letters, 43(6):622–624.
Aziz, H., Goldberg, P., and Walsh, T. (2017). Equilibria in Sequential Alloca-
tion. arXiv preprint 1705.09444.
Babaioff, M., Nisan, N., and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2017). Competitive Equilibria
with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets. arXiv preprint 1803.05470.
Barman, S. and Krishnamurthy, S. K. (2019). On the proximity of markets with
integral equilibria. In AAAI’19. arXiv preprint 1811.08673.
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., Sandomirskiy, F., and Yanovskaya, E. (2017).
Competitive division of a mixed manna. Econometrica, 85(6):1847–1871.
arXiv preprint 1702.00616.
9 A possible condition that catches this issue is: “if b > (a−b)+b/2, then for every partition
of A into two parts A1 ∪A2, Bob prefers B either to A1, or to A2 ∪
([
1
2
]
B
)
”. This condition
is much less natural than Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, and it is not clear how to generalize it.
34
Bouveret, S. and Lang, J. (2011). A General Elicitation-free Protocol for Allo-
cating Indivisible Goods. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One, IJCAI’11,
pages 73–78. AAAI Press.
Bouveret, S. and Lemaˆıtre, M. (2016). Characterizing conflicts in fair division
of indivisible goods using a scale of criteria. Autonomous Agents and Multi-
Agent Systems, 30(2):1–32.
Brams, S. J. (2007). Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and
Fair-Division Procedures. Princeton University Press, 1st edition.
Brams, S. J. and Kaplan, T. R. (2004). Dividing the Indivisible. Journal of
Theoretical Politics, 16(2):143–173.
Braˆnzei, S., Chen, Y., Deng, X., Filos-Ratsikas, A., Frederiksen, S. K., and
Zhang, J. (2014). The Fisher Market Game: Equilibrium and Welfare. In
AAAI ’14. AAAI Press.
Braˆnzei, S., Hosseini, H., and Miltersen, P. (2015). Characterization and Com-
putation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods. In Hoefer, M., editor, Algorith-
mic Game Theory, volume 9347 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
244–255. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Braˆnzei, S., Lv, Y., and Mehta, R. (2016). To Give or Not to Give: Fair
Division for Single Minded Valuations. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’16), pages
123–129.
Budish, E. (2011). The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate
Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes. Journal of Political Economy,
119(6):1061–1103.
Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N., and
Wang, J. (2016). The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. In
17th ACM conference on Economic and Computation (EC’16).
Cseh, A´. and Fleiner, T. (2018). The complexity of cake cutting with unequal
shares. In International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 19–
30. Springer. arXiv preprint 1709.03152.
Deng, X., Papadimitriou, C., and Safra, S. (2003). On the complexity of price
equilibria. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 67(2):311–324.
Erlich, S., Hazon, N., and Kraus, S. (2018). Negotiation strategies for agents
with ordinal preferences. In IJCAI’18. arXiv preprint 1805.00913.
Farhadi, A., Ghodsi, M., Hajiaghayi, M., Lahaie, S., Pennock, D., Seddighin,
M., Seddighin, S., and Yami, H. (2017). Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
to Asymmetric Agents. In AAMAS’17. arXiv preprint 1703.01649.
35
Heinen, T., Nguyen, N.-T., and Rothe, J. (2015). Fairness and Rank-Weighted
Utilitarianism in Resource Allocation. In Walsh, T., editor, Algorithmic De-
cision Theory, volume 9346 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
521–536. Springer International Publishing.
Kalinowski, T., Narodytska, N., and Walsh, T. (2013). A Social Welfare Op-
timal Sequential Allocation Procedure. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI ’13, pages
227–233. AAAI Press.
O’Leary, B., Grofman, B., and Elklit, J. (2005). Divisor Methods for Sequential
Portfolio Allocation in Multi-Party Executive Bodies: Evidence from North-
ern Ireland and Denmark. American Journal of Political Science, 49(1):198–
211.
Othman, A., Papadimitriou, C., and Rubinstein, A. (2016). The Complexity of
Fairness Through Equilibrium. ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., 4(4).
Reijnierse, J. H. and Potters, J. A. M. (1998). On finding an envy-free Pareto-
optimal division. Mathematical Programming, 83(1-3):291–311.
Segal-Halevi, E. (2018). Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many
Cuts are Needed? arXiv preprint 1803.05470.
Segal-Halevi, E. and Sziklai, B. R. (2018). Monotonicity and Competitive
Equilibrium in Cake-cutting. Economic Theory, pages 1–39. arXiv preprint
1510.05229.
Weller, D. (1985). Fair division of a measurable space. Journal of Mathematical
Economics, 14(1):5–17.
36
